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The	Metaphysics	of	Evolution		John	Dupré	Egenis,	University	of	Exeter		Keywords:	Process	Ontology,	Evolution,	Species,	Lineage,	Individual		Abstract		This	paper	briefly	describes	process	metaphysics,	and	argues	that	it	is	better	suited	for	describing	life	than	the	more	standard	thing,	or	substance,	metaphysics.		It	then	explores	the	implications	of	process	metaphysics	for	conceptualising	evolution.		After	explaining	what	it	is	for	an	organism	to	be	a	process,	the	paper	takes	up	the	Hull/Ghiselin	thesis	of	species	as	individuals	and	explores	the	conditions	under	which	a	species	or	lineage	could	constitute	an	individual	process.		It	is	argued	that	only	sexual	species	satisfy	these	conditions,	and	that	within	sexual	species	the	degree	of	organisation	varies.	This,	in	turn,	has	important	implications	for	the	species’	evolvability.		One	important	moral	is	that	evolution	will	work	differently	in	different	biological	domains.				1.	Introduction:	Why	metaphysics?		Metaphysics	is	the	branch	of	philosophy	that	aspires	to	provide	the	most	general	description	of	reality.	Metaphysics	aims	to	say	what	exists,	but	at	a	more	general	and	abstract	level	than	that	typical	of	practical	science	or,	for	that	matter,	everyday	life.		It	may	ask,	for	example,	whether	there	is	one	kind	of	being,	two	(as	Descartes	believed),	or	many.	It	may	ask	about	the	relations	between	very	broad	categories	of	entities.		Now	almost	all	biologists	believe	that	living	beings	are	made	of	the	same	kind	of	material	stuff	as	the	non-living;	once,	however,	it	was	common	to	suppose	that	investigating	life	involved	investigating	something	in	certain	respects,	at	least,	quite	different	from	the	vulgarly	material.		This,	one	might	say,	is	an	example	of	progress	in	metaphysics.		The	last	example	also	illustrates	that,	though	they	may	sincerely	deny	it,	scientists	are	almost	inevitably	committed	to	metaphysical	opinions,	and	that	these	make	a	difference	to	their	work.	A	biologist	not	committed	to	the	materialist	metaphysics	mentioned	in	the	last	paragraph	would	not	look	for	the	fundamental	understanding	of	life	in	the	properties	of	specific	kinds	of	matter.	Metaphysics	can	be	ignored	but	not	escaped.		In	the	words	of	theoretical	biologist	and	philosopher	Joseph	Henry	Woodger,	"physiologists	[who]	suppose	themselves	to	be	above	‘metaphysics’	[…]	are	only	a	very	little	above	it—being	up	to	the	neck	in	it’’	(Woodger	1929	p.	246).			The	metaphysics	I	am	interested	in	is	a	naturalistic	one,	providing	an	ontology,	an	account	of	what	exists,	ultimately	grounded	in	our	best	science.	I	have	said	that	scientists	cannot	avoid	metaphysical	assumptions,	but	these	need	not	be	explicit.	Philosophical	analysis	of	scientific	work	may	help	to	expose	these	asumptions.		But	philosophical	reflection	on	scientific	findings	may	also	point	to	an	ontology	different	in	important	respects	from	that	originally	assumed.	One	
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reason	it	may	do	so	is	that	philosophical	enquiry	of	this	sort	is	free	to	range	over	all	domains	of	scientific	enquiry.		One	motivation	for	ontological	enquiry	is	thus	to	explore	the	consistency	of	interpretation	of	scientific	results	across	the	sciences	or	their	subfields.			The	metaphysical	question	with	which	this	paper	is	concerned	is	an	ancient	one,	the	debate	whether	the	world	is	ultimately	composed	of	things,	perhaps	eternal	and	immutable	things	as	was	proposed	by	the	Greek	atomists,	or	rather	is	everywhere	in	flux,	as	famously	advocated	by	the	Greek	philosopher	Heraclitus.		For	process	philosophers,	enduring	things,	rather	than	being	the	more	or	less	unchanging	furniture	of	the	world,	are	“never	more	than	patterns	of	stability	in	a	sea	of	process”	(Rescher,	2004).			The	ontology	of	things,	following	the	revival	of	atomism	in	the	seventeenth	century,	has	been	the	dominant	metaphysics	for	most	of	the	history	of	modern	science.		It	is	closely	connected	to	a	further	position	that	underlies	conceptions	of	scientific	explanation,	mechanicism.		For	mechanicism,	the	way	to	understand	or	explain	a	phenomenon	is	to	identify	the	various	constituent	things	that	interact	to	generate	the	phenomenon.	Arrangements	of	constituents	with	particular	functions	constitute	mechanisms.	Mechanicism	sees	living	systems	as	composed	of	things	arranged	in	a	hierarchy	of	mechanisms.	This	is	a	strictly	bottom-up	perspective,	related	to,	if	generally	distinguished	from,	the	often	criticised	but	still	widely	endorsed	methodological	approach	of	reductionism.		Process	ontologists	generally	reject	both	mechanicism	and	reductionism,	for	they	notice	that	what	maintains	the	patterns	of	stability	in	the	sea	of	process	is	not	only	the	behaviour	of	the	entities	that	compose	the	pattern,	but	also	the	network	of	relations	between	the	patterns	and	their	surroundings	(Dupré	2012).				The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	explore	the	relevance	of	process	ontology	to	evolutionary	theory.	Of	course,	no	one	doubts	that	evolution	itself	is	a	process.	Thing	(or	substance,	as	a	particular,	very	influential	version	of	the	concept	is	often	referred	to	in	philosophical	writing	[Robinson	2014])	ontologists	do	not	deny	that	there	are	processes;	it	is	rather	that	they	see	processes	as	generally	requiring	things	as	their	subjects,	as	what	happens	to	things.		For	process	ontology,	evolution	is	also,	of	course,	a	process,	but	the	organisms	and	the	lineages	that	are	the	subject	matter	of	evolution	are	themselves	also	processes.		I	shall	try	very	briefly	to	justify	these	claims,	and	then	examine	some	of	the	implications	they	involve	for	how	we	should	think	about	evolution.			2.	Process	Metaphysics		What	is	the	difference	between	seeing	some	entity	as	a	thing,	on	the	one	hand,	or	as	a	temporarily	stable	process,	on	the	other?	Consider	two	paradigm	cases:	a	mountain	and	a	storm.		A	mountain	is	naturally	thought	of	as	a	fairly	fixed	part	of	the	world’s	furnishings;	if	any	major	change	befalls	it	we	are	entitled	to	wonder	why.	In	fact,	in	the	context	of	a	more	generalized	process	ontology,	on	the	time	scale	of	tectonics	the	mountain	is	very	much	a	stage	in	a	process:	for	process	ontology,	being	a	thing	is	always	relative	to	a	time	scale.		The	mountain	will,	nonetheless,	serve	well	enough	as	an	intuitive	paradigm	for	a	static	thing,	
	 3	
deriving	its	stability	from	inertia.		Philosophers	have	asked	how	it	is	even	possible	for	a	thing	to	change	and	yet	remain	the	same	thing	through	time,	and	they	have	generally	answered	by	positing	some	core	of	essential	properties	that	must	remain	fixed	regardless	of	the	extent	of	change.		A	storm	may	also	be	a	very	stable	element	of	the	world.		The	Red	Spot	on	Jupiter,	for	instance,	has	been	observed	for	several	centuries,	albeit	with	gradual	changes	in	shape	and	size.		But	unlike	the	mountain,	the	Red	Spot	does	not	persist	because	nothing	happens	to	change	it,	but	because	a	stable	pattern	is	maintained	by	the	very	rapid	winds	that	circulate	round	it.		If	this	activity	ceased	the	Red	Spot	would	dissipate	very	quickly.		Its	persistence	through	time	is	understood	not	through	unchanging	essential	properties	but	through	the	causal	continuity	of	the	processes	that	maintain	the	pattern.		A	process	ontology	for	life	starts	with	the	idea	that	the	Red	Spot	is	a	more	useful	paradigm	for	living	systems	than	the	mountain.			Two	simple	points	should	be	sufficient	to	confirm	the	appropriateness	of	the	dynamic,	processual	perspective	for	thinking	of	biological	systems.		Consider,	as	paradigm	living	systems,	organisms.	The	first,	decisive	reason	for	taking	organisms	to	be	processes	is	that	they	are	open	systems,	far	from	thermodynamic	equilibrium.		It	is	an	elementary	fact	of	physics	that	maintaining	such	a	system	will	require	constant	interaction	with,	and	intake	of	matter	or	energy	from,	the	environment.		Its	persistence	is	actively	maintained	rather	than	just	given.	Stasis,	for	an	organism,	is	death.			Second,	organisms	undergo	developmental	cycles.	Consider	for	instance	the	typical	life	cycle	of	an	insect,	comprising	the	egg,	larva,	pupa,	and	adult.		These	stages	have	very	different	properties.		It	is	unclear	what	properties	could	possibly	support	the	claim	that	these	developmental	stages	were	all	one	and	the	same	thing.	What	could	be	an	essential	property	of	such	a	thing?		It	is	sometimes	suggested	that	genome	sequence	might	provide	such	an	essential,	continuing	property	for	an	organism.	I	have	responded	to	this	idea	in	detail	in	(Dupré	2010),	but	perhaps	a	sufficient	response	is	to	note	the	work	that	the	cell	has	to	do	to	sustain	a	sufficiently	accurate	sequence	(Noble,	this	volume):	genome	sequence	is	as	much	the	consequence	of	organismic	stability	as	it	is	its	source.	For	a	process,	at	any	rate,	no	such	constant	property	is	required:	persistence	is	something	the	organism	achieves,	not	some	property		or	properties	that	it	continues	to	possess.		A	process	is	inherently	extended	in	time,	and	whatever	claims	temporal	parts	of	a	process	have	to	be	parts	of	one	and	the	same	process	derive	rather	from	causal	connections	between	these	parts.		Let	me	now	mention	two	reasons	why	the	insistence	that	living	systems	are	processes	rather	than	things	matters.		The	first	is	that	it	motivates	a	significant	shift	in	emphasis	with	respect	to	what	stands	in	need	of	explanation.		The	traditional	concern	for	thing-centred	ontology	is	change.		I	do	not	expect	an	explanation	of	why	my	desk	is	very	much	as	I	left	it	when	I	was	last	in	my	office.		For	a	process,	on	the	other	hand,	persistence	requires	explanation.		Physiology	is	largely	concerned	with	understanding	the	multitude	of	internal	processes	that	
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enable	an	organism	to	stay	alive,	to	maintain	its	thermodynamic	disequilibrium	with	its	environment.				A	clarification	is	needed	at	this	point.	When	I	refer	to	a	process	I	shall,	henceforth	unless	otherwise	stated	or	obvious,	mean	an	individual	process,	a	process	with	the	sort	of	coherence	and	persistence	that	might	suggest	treating	it	as	a	thing.		Organisms,	on	my	view,	are	paradigms	of	such	coherent	individual	processes,	though	less	controversially	processual	entities	such	as	storms	or	rivers	also	have	good	claims	to	be	individuals.	Some	processes—erosion,	inflation,	evolution—lack	any	such	coherence.		I	shall	not	address	philosophical	doubts	as	to	whether	there	even	are	individual	processes	that	persist	through	time,	though	the	discussion	may	give	some	indication	of	why	such	doubts	arise	and	also	of	why	they	are	misplaced.		The	second	reason	why	the	processual	status	of	organisms	is	important	is	that	it	places	in	the	proper	perspective	the	search	for	mechanistic	explanation	that	is	often	alleged	to	be	central	to	the	contemporary	life	sciences	(Machamer,	Darden	and	Craver	2000;	Craver	and	Darden	2013).		I	take	a	mechanistic	explanation	to	be,	very	roughly,	one	that	involves	identifying	a	set	of	constituents	of	a	phenomenon	and	showing	how	their	actions	and	interactions	combine	to	generate	the	phenomenon.		There	is	no	doubt	that	this	has	been	an	enormously	productive	scientific	strategy.		Nonetheless,	from	a	process	perspective	the	mechanisms	postulated	by	such	explanations	must	always	be	abstractions	from	the	wider	biological	context,	and	this	always	poses	potential	limits	on	their	application.	First,	the	constituents	of	a	biological	mechanism	are	themselves	dynamic	and	more	or	less	transient	entities.		Mechanistic	explanations	will	be	successful	only	to	the	extent	that	the	constituents	identified	are	sufficiently	stable	on	the	time	scale	of	the	phenomenon	under	investigation.		And	second,	biological	processes	are	typically	stabilised	not	just	by	the	interactions	of	their	parts,	but	also	by	interactions	of	the	whole	with	its	wider	biological	and	abiotic	context.		These	limitations	do	not	imply	that	mechanistic	explanations	cannot	be	extremely	illuminating;	they	do	show	that	their	success	should	not	be	taken	as	a	sufficient	reason	for	inferring	that	the	organism	really	is	an	interlocking	system	of	mechanisms.		It	is	not.			I	should	note	that	contemporary	mechanicists,	or	“new	mechanists”	as	they	are	widely	known,	are	a	diverse	group	with	views	that	diverge	in	many	ways	from	the	very	rough	summary	just	offered.		Machamer,	Darden	and	Carver	(2000)	acknowledge	the	ontological	importance	of	processes,	but	as	part	of	a	dualistic	ontology	very	different	from	that	advocated	here.		Craver	and	Bechtel	(2007)	explicitly	address	the	question	of	interlevel	explanation,	though	denying	that	there	is	anything	properly	described	as	downward	causation.		Recent	work	by	Bechtel	qualifies	this	sceptical	view	on	downward	causation	(e.g.	Bechtel	2017)	and	generally	endorses	many	of	the	positions	here	associated	with	process	ontology.		Bechtel’s	status	as	a	new	mechanist,	however,	is	a	matter	of	debate	(Bechtel,	personal	communication).		Since	this	is	not,	at	any	rate,	a	paper	about	mechanicism,	I	shall	not	attempt	to	explore	these	divergences	and	subtleties	further.			
	 5	
The	organism	should	not	be	seen	as	a	hierarchy	of	interconnected	things,	but	rather	as	a	hierarchy	of	processes	at	molecular,	cellular,	tissue,	organ,	etc.	levels,	operating	at	different	interlocking	time	scales	(DiFrisco	2016).		At	each	level	the	more	or	less	stable	entities—molecules,	cells,	organs—are	stabilised	both	by	their	internal	activities	and	by	their	interactions	with	their	wider	environments.		The	organism	itself,	of	course,	is	not	the	terminus	of	this	hierarchy,	but	just	one	further	component.		The	stability	of	the	organism	also	depends	in	part	on	its	dynamic	relation	to	its	biotic	and	abiotic	environment.		3.	What	evolves?			Organisms	do	not,	of	course,	evolve.		Evolution	relates	to	the	distribution	of	the	properties	of	organisms	over	time.		What	organisms?	It	is	commonly	said	that	the	relevant	group	of	organisms	should	constitute	a	lineage,	and	sometimes	that	the	relevant	lineage	is	a	species,	which	can	even	be	made	true	by	fiat	as	in	G.	G.	Simpson’s	(1961)	definition:	“a	lineage	(an	ancestral	descendent	sequence	of	populations)	evolving	separately	from	others	and	with	its	own	unitary	evolutionary	role”.		Technically,	it	is	better	to	talk	of	populations,	as	a	species	may	consist	of	a	number	of	isolated	populations,	hence	evolving	separately,	but	for	present	purposes	it	will	do	no	harm	to	speak	of	species.		A	reason	for	doing	so	is	that	it	will	be	useful	to	connect	with	the	extensive	philosophical	literature	on	the	nature	of	species,	reminding	ourselves	thereby	that	it	is	a	matter	of	great	uncertainty	what	constitutes	the	appropriate	kind	of	coherent	lineage.		It	is	popularly	supposed,	reflecting	the	lasting	influence	of	Ernst	Mayr,	that	species	are	interbreeding	groups	of	organisms.		But	we	need	only	note	that	the	vast	majority	of	species,	and	all	species	for	the	first	80%	or	so	of	the	history	of	life,	are	asexual	to	see	that	this	account	is	seriously	limited.		(Perhaps	Mayr’s	rather	dismissive	attitude	to	microbes	has	helped	to	direct	attention	from	this	embarrassment	to	his	so-called	Biological	Species	Concept.)		A	rather	different	issue	has	been	widely	debated	by	philosophers	of	biology,	namely	the	question	whether	species	are	kinds	or,	rather,	individuals.	Philosophers	have	traditionally	taken	species	terms	as	paradigmatic	classificatory	terms,	and	hence	as	referring	to	all	the	things	that	satisfy	the	conditions	of	membership	of	the	relevant	kind.		But	Michael	Ghiselin	(1974)	and	David	Hull	(1978)	have	persuaded	the	majority	of	the	philosophical	community	that	species	are,	on	the	contrary,	individuals.		Species,	according	to	Ghiselin	and	Hull,	and	in	accordance	with	the	influential	cladistic	school	of	systematics,	are	properly	understood	as	branches	of	the	phylogenetic	tree.		I	believe	the	species	as	individuals	view	is	partly	correct,	though	with	two	very	important	provisos.		First,	a	branch	of	the	phylogenetic	tree	is	a	process	not	a	thing.	Apart	from	subsuming	the	obvious	point	that	any	part	of	the	phylogenetic	tree	is	temporally	extended	and	constantly	changing,	recognition	of	its	processual	character	immediately	addresses	some	serious	concerns	that	have	been	raised	about	the	species	as	individuals	thesis.		An	obvious	such	objection	is	that	the	alleged	parts	of	a	species	are	highly	discontinuous.		How	are	they	identified	as	parts?		Ruse	(1987),	a	prominent	critic	of	the	species	as	individuals	thesis,	notes	that	the	important	point	might	be	integration	rather	than	actual	
	 6	
physical	connection	between	the	parts	of	an	individual,	but	then	complains	that	where	the	only	connection	between	the	parts	of	a	supposed	individual	species	is	descent,	descent	begins	to	look	suspiciously	like	an	essential	property	that	serves	to	define	a	class.		Indeed	exactly	this	view	was	subsequently	defended	by	Griffiths	(1999)	and	others.			For	a	species-as-individual	process	view,	however,	there	is	no	problem	to	address.		A	process	is	necessarily	extended	in	time,	and	causal	relations	between	temporal	stages,	or	between	spatial	parts	of	temporal	stages,	are	required	to	provide	it	with	whatever	integrity	it	has.		Descent	is	just	such	a	causal	connection.		A	similar	problem	arises	with	regard	to	ambiguity	of	boundaries.		Species	have	somewhat	vague	boundaries	both	synchronically	(hybridization,)	and	temporally	(speciation).	Again,	while	this	is	difficult	to	align	with	standard	metaphysical	accounts	of	an	individual,	it	is	no	problem	at	all	for	a	process.		No	one	expects	a	thunderstorm	or	a	battle	to	have	precisely	delineated	boundaries.			In	fact,	similar	problems	apply	to	organisms.		Anyone	who	believes	in	superorganisms,	for	example	ant	colonies,	that	may	include,	as	well	as	various	castes	of	ant,	domesticated	fungi	and	several	essential	consortia	of	microbes,	is	happy	with	discontinuous	organisms.	And	the	spectrum	of	degrees	of	integration	with	symbionts,	from	mitochondria,	widely	thought	of	as	parts	of	their	hosts,	through	genomically-reduced	obligate	symbionts	such	as	Wolbachia	and	
Buchnera	and	obligate	but	horizontally	acquired	symbionts	to,	finally,	purely	ecological	mutualisms,	makes	it	difficult	to	define	unambiguous	boundaries	to	the	organism.	Processes	are	more	or	less	well	integrated,	more	or	less	clearly	demarcated.		As	Hull	notes,	“Most	organisms	do	exhibit	more	internal	organization	than	most	species,	but	this	difference	is	one	of	degree,	not	kind.	Most	species	do	not	exhibit	the	internal	organization	common	in	vertebrate	organisms,	but	the	same	can	be	said	for	plants	as	organisms.	Most	plants	do	not	exhibit	the	internal	organization	common	in	vertebrate	organisms.”	(Hull,	1999,	32).		My	second	proviso	perhaps	deviates	more	strongly	from	the	spirit	of	the	species	as	individuals	thesis.		It	is	that	while	it	is	sometimes	useful	and	correct	to	treat	species	as	individuals,	they	can	also,	equally	correctly	be	treated	as	classificatory	terms.		In	fact,	as	I	shall	argue,	it	may	very	well	be	that	some	species	can	only	be	treated	in	the	second	way.		The	point	here	is	that	classification	is	a	vital	part	of	any	scientific	project,	and	especially	vital	in	a	domain	with	the	vast	diversity	of	biology.		As	I	have	argued	elsewhere	in	more	detail	(Dupré	1994,	2001),	the	importance	of	classification	provides	special	desiderata	for	distinguishing	species,	and	these	should	not	be	outweighed	by	sometimes	transient	theoretical	considerations.		In	short,	species	can	be	units	of	evolution,	units	within	which	evolutionary	change	takes	place	and	as	such	should	be	seen	as	individual	processes;	but	this	cannot	supplant	their	equal	importance	as	units	of	classification	(see	also	Reydon	2003).				4.	Stabilisation	of	species	processes		If	(some)	species	are	individual	processes,	we	should	ask,	as	discussed	above,	
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what	it	is	that	maintains	their	coherence	or	integration	over	time.		Note	here	that	while	not	all	processes	need	have	either	integration	or	individual	status,	to	have	the	latter	one	must	have	the	former.		Geological	erosion,	for	example,	is	a	process	with	no	integration;	there	is	no	temptation	to	divide	it	into	distinct	individuals.	But	if	Hull	and	Ghiselin	are	right,	species	must	be	stabilized	processes.		A	first,	and	very	important	part	of	the	answer	to	what	makes	species	stable,	is	natural	selection.	It	has	often	been	proposed	that	most	selection	is	stabilizing	selection,	and	the	continued	production	over	sometimes	very	long	periods	of	time	of	very	similar	phenotypes	is	generally	attributed	not	to	the	perfection	of	the	reproductive	process,	but	to	the	greater	selective	success	of	a	particular	phenotype.		As	Reiss	(2009)	persuasively	argues,	much	of	the	importance	of	natural	selectioost	illuminatingly	understood	under	the	rubric	of	the	conditions	
of	existence,	a	phrase	used	by	Darwin,	but	more	often	associated	with	Georges	Cuvier.		It	is	no	trivial	matter	for	an	organism	to	satisfy	the	conditions	of	existence,	and	if	the	areas	of	morphospace	that	make	this	possible	are	very	limited,	natural	selection	will	maintain	homogeneous	species.		Darwin	also	famously	observed	the	production	of	organisms	far	beyond	the	numbers	required	to	maintain	a	species.		Though	this	is	generally	remarked	as	part	of	the	story	of	adaptive	evolutionary	change,	it	is	also	important	that	the	stability	of	the	species	requires	overproduction	to	compensate	for	the	production	of	inviable	individuals	and	the	random	losses	of	pre-reproductive	individuals.		The	latter,	in	many	cases,	will	constitute	the	overwhelming	proportion	of	cases.	Overproduction,	in	short,	is	necessary	not	just	for	adaptive	evolutionary	change,	but	also	for	stable	maintenance	of	the	lineage.	Natural	selection	is	not,	of	course,	sufficient	to	stabilize	a	species	over	time.		Just	as	an	organism	must	constantly	renew	the	cells	of	which	it	is	composed,	so	a	species,	qua	individual,	must	replace	the	organisms	that	are	its	parts.		The	Modern	Synthesis	has	understood	this	process	of	reproduction	as,	at	its	core,	replication,	and	this	is	a	central	point	of	criticism	for	advocates	of	an	extended,	or	more	radically	replaced,	understanding	of	evolution.		By	replication	here	I	mean	exact	copying,	as	is	generally	understood	to	occur	when	a	DNA	sequence	serves	as	a	template	for	an	identical	sequence.		(For	discussion	of	the	distinction	between	reproduction	and	replication,	see	(Hull	and	Wilkins	2014).)	The	quasi-digital	nature	of	this	process	grounds	the	claim	that	this	is	exact	copying,	and	underlies	Richard	Dawkins’	rather	strange	claim	that	genes	are	immortal	(Dawkins	1976,	ch.	3):	the	nucleotide	sequence	can,	in	principle,	be	precisely	replicated	in	perpetuity.	With	more	or	less	hedging,	the	Modern	Synthesis	has	taken	this	to	be	the	overwhelmingly	important	part	of	reproduction,	more	or	less	explicitly,	thereby,	assuming	that	the	DNA	sequence	was	sufficient	to	determine	the	phenotype.				There	is	much	more	to	reproduction,	however,	than	replication.		Reproduction	means,	as	the	etymology	suggests,	producing	again,	and	there	is	no	reason	in	principle	why	the	production	of	a	new	organism	in	a	lineage	should	involve	the	replication	of	anything.		As	a	matter	of	fact	it	appears	that	terrestrial	reproduction	always	involves	nucleic	acid	sequence	replication	but,	as	various	contributors	to	this	volume	have	demonstrated	(e.g.	Muller	on	development;	
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Stotz	on	parental	effects;	Jablonka	on	non-genetic	inheritance),	it	involves	much	else	besides.		Moreover	as	Noble	(this	volume)	emphasizes,	the	nucleic	acid	sequences	that	are	generally	thought	of	as	targets	of	replication	are	only	maintained	in	a	persistent	state	by	elaborate	editing	and	correcting	processes	in	the	cell,	and	thus	may	themselves	be	better	described	as	being	reproduced.				The	stability	of	a	lineage,	finally,	depends	crucially	on	its	relations	with	the	external	environment.		But	rather	than	this	being,	as	has	often	been	supposed,	something	achieved	by	the	passive	adaptation	of	the	evolving	lineage	to	the	demands	of	the	environment,	the	organisms	in	a	typical	lineage	do	a	great	deal	to	adapt	the	environment	to	their	needs,	so-called	niche	construction	(Laland,	this	volume;	Odling-Smee	et	al.	2003).		This	may	amount	to	full-scale	engineering	of	the	environment	(Jones	et	al.	1994),	as	in	the	classic	examples	of	beaver	dam	building	or	coral	reef	formation,	but	may	also	take	more	local	forms,	such	as	nest	building	and	burrow	digging.		In	fact	all	organisms	have	some	effect	on	their	environment,	and	therefore	on	the	conditions	of	existence	that	they	must	satisfy.			Niche	construction	is	often	compared	to	Richard	Dawkins’s	(1982)	concept	of	the	extended	phenotype.		For	Dawkins	the	beaver’s	dam	or	bird’s	nest	is	part	of	the	(extended)	phenotype	of	the	beaver	or	bird,	encoded	in	its	genes	and	expressed	as	the	animal	creates	the	external	structure.	Niche	construction	theorists,	however,	emphasize	the	bi-directionality	of	the	relation.		The	altered	niche	affects	the	behaviour	and	ultimately	drives	the	evolution	of	the	organism.				The	difference	in	these	perspectives	nicely	illustrates	the	difference	between	a	thing-	and	a	process-centred	ontology.		The	extended	phenotype	concept	extends	the	boundaries	of	the	object	(organism),	but	these	boundaries	are	still	fully	determined	by	that	object’s	internal,	intrinsic	properties,	and	the	lineage	is	just	the	sum	of	these	objects.		Seeing	the	organism,	or	in	this	case	the	lineage,	as	a	process,	on	the	other	hand,	we	should	expect	its	limits	to	be	maintained	by	activities	at	its	boundaries,	as	a	living	membrane	actively	transports	numerous	molecules	to	maintain	the	chemical	discontinuity	it	marks,	or	the	surrounding	flows	maintain	a	whirlpool.		This	is	just	the	difference	the	niche	construction	perspective	signals	from	the	extended	phenotype.				If	species	are	processes	of	this	kind,	then	evolution	is	the	change	within	such	processes.	Stabilisation	of	a	process	is	always	limited,	so	some	such	change	is	to	be	expected,	as	has	been	extensively	discussed	in	accounts	of	drift.	Where	does	adaptive	change	come	from?		A	trivial	but	sometimes	obfuscated	point	is	that	it	never	comes	from	natural	selection.		Selection	cannot	occur	unless	some	other	process	provides	alternatives	to	select	from.		It	follows	that	any	thesis	about	the	power	of	natural	selection	to	generate	change	implicitly	presupposes	a	thesis	about	a	process	or	processes	that	generate	selectable	change.		A	distinctive	thesis	in	the	Modern	Synthesis	is	that	the	overwhelmingly	predominant	source	of	selectable	change	is	small	random	mutations,	and	consequently	views	about	the	power	of	natural	selection	have	sometimes	smuggled	in	assumptions	about	the	ability	of	cumulative	small	mutations	to	generate	almost	arbitrary	degrees	of	phenotypic	change.		Contributors	to	this	special	issue	describe	various	other	sources	of	variation,	and	indeed	of	adaptive	variation,	so	questions	about	the	
	 9	
efficacy	of	particular	sources	including	random	mutation	should	be	seen	as	open.		I	shall	turn	very	briefly	to	enumeration	of	some	sources	of	adaptive	variation	towards	the	end	of	this	paper.			5.	Kinds	of	Lineage	and	Degrees	of	Integration		More	or	less	stable,	coherent	lineages	are	not	necessary	for	evolutionary	change.		The	first	2.5	billion	years	of	solely	unicellular	life	were	apparently	characterized	by	asexual	reproduction	and	promiscuous	lateral	transfer	of	genes	between	sometimes	distantly	related	individuals.	It	is	hard	to	see	why	there	should	be	any	well-distinguished,	species-like	sub-processes	within	this	evolving	whole.		To	the	extent	that	there	are	strong	divisions	between	kinds,	this	is	likely	to	be	because	natural	selection	favours	and	disfavours	particular	areas	of	morphospace.		Put	differently,	the	combinations	of	traits	that	satisfy	the	conditions	of	existence	occupy	discontinuous	regions	of	trait	space.		(This	does	rather	oversimplify	the	matter,	as	the	conditions	of	existence	depend	on	what	other	organisms	concurrently	exist.		But	this	shouldn’t	significantly	affect	the	main	point.)			Sexual	reproduction	introduces	something	quite	new,	internal	integration	of	the	lineage.		Sex	involves	both	horizontal	and	vertical	connections	between	members	of	a	species:	horizontal	between	sexual	partners	and	vertical	between	parents	and	offspring.	Boundaries	between	species	reflect	not	merely	the	contingencies	of	adaptation,	but	the	fact	that	species	have	more	or	less	effective	means	of	policing	their	boundaries.		The	importance	of	this	policing	was	particularly	stressed	by	Paterson’s	(1985)	mate	recognition	species	concept,	defining	species	in	terms	of	the	ways	that	members	were	distinguished	from	non-members	for	reproductive	purposes.	Surely	this	overestimates	the	effectiveness	of	this	boundary-preserving	activity	and	underestimates	the	frequency	of	hybridization	and,	for	that	matter,	its	important	role	in	speciation	(Pennisi,	2016;	Mallet	2008).		But	as	already	noted,	vague	boundaries	are	no	problem	or	surprise	between	processes.				I	suggest	that	the	invention	or	emergence	of	sex	is	also	the	emergence	of	species	as	individuals.		Without	sex	there	are	no	horizontal	relations	between	the	members	of	a	species	and	they	are	connected	only	by	their	ancestry.		But	unless	every	individual,	or	at	least	every	individual	with	a	minimal	novelty	(e.g.	a	point	mutation),	is	the	ancestor	of	a	new	species	there	must	be	some	horizontal	connections	that	establish	a	group	of	individuals	as	an	appropriate	set	of	ancestors	to	found	a	species,	and	we	appear	to	be	launched	on	an	infinite	regress.	If	there	existed	species-like	processes	prior	to	sexual	reproduction,	these	lacked	any	coherence	or	integration	that	could	qualify	them	as	processual	individuals	with	persistence	as	such	through	time.		This	proposal	also	puts	Mayr’s	familiar	biological	species	concept	in	a	slightly	different	light.		Reproductive	connections	are	indeed	fundamental	to	the	existence	of	species	as	
individuals.				Sex	is	a	minimal	condition	for	a	species	to	form	as	a	coherent	individual.		In	many,	perhaps	most,	sexual	species	it	provides	all	the	coherence	that	there	is.		This	is	generally	the	case,	at	any	rate,	for	those	species	that	ecologists	have	
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described	as	r-selected,	species,	that	is	to	say,	that	produce	very	large	numbers	of	offspring	of	which	a	tiny	fraction	will	survive.	(The	distinction	between	r-	and	K-selected	species	has	been	largely	abandoned	by	ecologists,	in	recognition	of	the	fact	that	there	is	a	continuum	of	intermediate	cases.		Here	I	use	the	terminology	only	to	indicate	the	extremes	of	this	spectrum.)		In	such	species	there	is	minimal	parental	investment	in	offspring,	and	little	opportunity	for	the	emergence	of	culture	or	sociality.	Frequently	the	contact	between	sexual	partners	is	also	minimal,	sometimes	in	great	danger	of	slipping	into	the	relation	of	predator	and	prey.	(I	shall	return	shortly	to	those	great	niche	constructors,	the	social	insects.)			It	is	true	that	fairly	r-selected	species	may	well	affect	their	niches,	and	may	do	so	in	ways	that	are	advantageous	to	themselves.		An	excellent	example	are	the	earthworms	studied	in	great	detail	by	Charles	Darwin	(1881).		The	typical	earthworm	is,	in	many	ways,	more	adapted	to	an	aquatic	than	to	a	terrestrial	life.		But	by	its	manipulation	of	the	soil,	notably	the	constant	introduction	of	decaying	organic	matter,	it	keeps	the	soil	wet	enough	to	meet	its	adaptive	requirements.		It	is	unclear	whether	this	is	properly	seen	as	a	species-maintaining	activity.		There	are	many	species	of	earthworm,	so	there	is	no	species-specific	benefit	to	their	alterations	of	the	environment.		It	is	an	interesting	speculation	that	such	processes	of	niche	construction	can	create	partially	coherent	supra-specific	lineages	at	a	much	higher	level	than	the	reproductively	connected	lineage.		But	I	shall	not	pursue	that	thought	here.		It	seems	likely	that	the	kind	of	local	and	focused	niche	construction	exemplified	by	beavers	or	nest-building	birds	is	not	found	except	where	there	is	major	parental	investment	in	offspring,	though	I	certainly	do	not	rule	out	the	possibility	that	more	broadly	directed	kinds	of	niche	construction	may	make	important	contributions	to	species	coherence.		With	K-selection,	the	strategy	of	producing	much	smaller	numbers	of	offspring	and	investing	heavily	in	their	development,	new	forms	of	integration	become	possible.		While	some	extragenetic	maternal	effects,	mediated	by	molecules	transferred	to	the	oocyte,	are	possible	even	for	strongly	r-selected	species,	substantial	periods	of	child-rearing	allow	far	greater	possibilities	for	parental,	most	commonly	maternal,	influence	on	the	developing	phenotype.		The	widely	recognized	phenomenon	of	phenotypic	plasticity	(West	Eberhard	2003)	provides	ample	opportunities	for	the	mother	to	divert	the	offspring’s	development	into	directions	that	are	adaptive	in	the	context	of	perceived	environmental	conditions.		Wolf	and	Wade	(2009)	define	maternal	effects	as	a	causal	connection	between	some	aspect	of	the	mother’s	genotype	or	phenotype,	and	the	phenotype	of	the	offspring.		Clearly	the	extended	period	of	parental	care	in	many	vertebrate	species	provides	many	opportunities	for	such	causal	connections,	and	processes	that	allow	parents	to	direct	development	in	adaptive	directions	will	be	strongly	selected.		It	seems	likely	a	priori	that	such	opportunities	would	be	exploited,	and	the	evidence	supports	this	expectation	(Stotz,	this	volume).				One	such	process	is	epigenetic	modification	of	the	offspring’s	genome.		Some	kind	of	epigenetic	system	seems	inevitable	for	a	multicellular	organism	with	highly	differentiated	cell	lineages.		The	existence	of	such	a	system,	in	turn,	
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provides	a	set	of	levers	by	which	the	parent	(or	any	other	aspect	of	the	developmental	environment)	can	influence	the	developmental	trajectory	of	the	organism.		It	again	seems	a	priori	plausible	that	parents	would	come	to	exploit	these	levers	in	adjusting	the	development	of	their	young	to	changeable	environmental	conditions.		And	again	this	appears	to	have	happened.		A	classic	instance	is	the	study	of	maternal	care	and	its	effect	on	the	behavioural	dispositions	of	rat	pups	by	Meaney	and	colleagues	(Meaney	et	al.	2007;	Champagne	and	Meaney	2006).			Parental	care	provides	opportunities	for	highly	targeted	niche	construction,	targeted,	specifically,	on	the	immediate	environment	of	the	offspring.		Birds’	nests	provide	a	paradigm	of	this	sort	of	activity,	but	social	insect	colonies	remind	us	that	this	kind	of	niche	construction	is	not	necessarily	tied	to	the	kind	of	intergenerational	relations	found	in	vertebrates.		This	is	becoming	a	familiar	aspect	of	current	evolutionary	thinking	(Odling-Smee	et	al.	2003;	Laland,	this	volume)	though	the	profound	significance	of	replacing	a	picture	in	which	the	evolving	lineage	reacts	passively	to	the	environment,	with	one	in	which	the	lineage	simultaneously	shapes	the	environment	to	which	it	adapts,	is	not	always	sufficiently	appreciated.		Parental	care	also	provides	unparalleled	opportunities	for	enculturation,	and	hence	for	the	evolution	more	generally	of	culturally	transmitted	behaviour.		Such	behaviour	may	also	have	physiological	effects,	for	example	mediated	by	epigenetic	modifications.		There	is	no	reason	in	principle	why	a	strongly	r-selected	species	might	not	develop	some	kind	of	culture,	and	for	all	I	know	there	may	be	examples	of	this.		Nonetheless,	it	seems	unlikely	that	there	could	be	any	very	complex	culture	in	the	absence	of	the	systematic	collocation	provided	by	parental	care.		Culture,	in	any	case,	provides	a	new	channel	for	both	horizontal	and	vertical	transmission	and	evolution	of	behavioural	traits.		A	further	crucial	feature	that	adds	a	new	dimension	of	integration	to	many	K-selected	lineages	is	sociality,	the	development	of	various	more	or	less	cooperative	relations	between	individuals	beyond	parents	and	offspring.		Though	this	is	a	complex	and	controversial	subject,	the	existence	of	sociality	is	an	indisputable	empirical	fact.		It	is	widely	though	not	universally	believed	that	sociality	creates	supra-organismic	level	entities	that	can	be	selected	(Sober	and	Wilson	1999).				In	most	social	species	it	is	assumed	that	social	groups	are	disjoint:	every	individual	is	a	member	of	at	most	one	social	group;	and	it	could	be	argued	that	in	that	case	sociality	does	not	add	to	the	integration	of	the	species,	but	only	adds	an	intervening	level	of	organisation	between	the	organism	and	the	species.		This	is	patently	not	the	case,	however,	for	humans.		Typical	humans	are	involved	in	numerous	social	groups,	more	or	less	cooperative	and	more	or	less	significant	to	the	course	of	their	lives.		Humans	belong	simultaneously	to	families,	organisations,	companies,	clubs,	churches,	political	parties,	etc.,	and	thus	the	species	is	connected	by	a	mass	of	criss-crossing	and	overlapping	links	and	supra-organismic	level	entities.				
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This	kind	of	social	integration	may	be	unique	to	humans,	indeed	even	to	modern	humans	in	complex	civilisations.		It	is	perhaps	part	of	the	reason	why	some	(e.g.	Wilson	2012)	have	thought	that	humans	exemplify	the	very	special	kind	of	sociality	known	as	eusociality.		The	paradigms	for	eusociality	are	the	social	insects,	numerous	species	of	Hymenoptera	(ants,	bees	and	wasps)	and	Isoptera	(termites).		It	is	also	said	to	be	found	in	two	mammalian	species	(of	mole	rats)	a	few	other	insect	species,	and	a	few	crustaceans.		The	most	distinctive	feature	of	eusociality	is	the	division	of	reproductive	from	non-reproductive	labour,	with	specialist	reproducers	and	communal	care	of	the	young	by	non-reproducers.		There	is	often	much	further	division	of	labour	into	so-called	castes.		Such	systems	provide	a	highly	effective	context	for	shaping	the	development	of	the	young	in	various	behaviourally	modulated	ways.	While	humans	certainly	don’t	have	a	distinct	reproductive	caste,	they	do	have	a	more	elaborate	division	of	labour	by	far	than	any	other	species.		So	although	eusocial	species	have	the	most	clear	cut	supra-organismic	level	of	organisation,	it	is	equally	clearly	a	disjoint	division	into	social	wholes.		Humans	may	be	unique	in	having	a	species-wide	network	of	cooperative	and	group-forming	relations,	and	may	therefore	reasonably	be	claimed	to	be	the	most	fully	integrated	species	we	know.			A	central	aspect	of	the	move	from	a	mechanistic	thing	ontology	to	a	process	ontology	is	that	the	commitment	to	strictly	bottom	up	causal	influences,	from	parts	to	wholes,	is	replaced	with	a	recognition	that	whole	systems	can	contribute	to	determining	the	properties	of	their	parts.	It	is,	therefore,	likely	that	the	emergence	of	the	species	as	an	integrated	individual	will	affect	the	behaviour	of	organisms,	its	parts.		The	most	obvious	relevant	examples	come	from	niche	construction,	and	the	most	obvious	specific	case	is	that	of	Homo	sapiens.		Modern	humans	live	in	a	constructed	niche	that	is	necessary	for	a	large	proportion	of	the	behaviour	they	undertake,	and	acquire	the	capacities	they	have	in	a	constructed	developmental	niche	including	hospitals,	schools,	and	a	great	deal	else	besides.		It	is	not,	of	course,	the	species	as	a	whole	that	produces	these	resources,	but	they	are	made	possible	by	numerous	distributed	parts	of	the	species,	generating	a	remarkable	degree	of	effective	cooperation.			In	sum,	although	any	lineage	may	be	said	to	be	a	process	of	a	sort,	the	degree	of	integration	of	these	processes	is	very	varied.		And	hence	the	degree	to	which	these	processes	may	count	as	persistent	individuals,	or	continuants,	is	very	varied.		Pace	Hull	and	Ghiselin,	not	all	species	are	individuals.		It	seems	plausible	that	the	kind	of	process	that	constitutes	a	particular	lineage	may	have	important	implications	for	the	evolutionary	processes	that	it	is	liable	to	undergo.			6.	Implications			Evolutionary	change	requires	sources	of	novelty.		Although	the	debate	over	the	current	status	of	the	Modern	Synthesis	is	often	presented	as	a	debate	about	the	importance	of	natural	selection,	this	is	misleading.		As	I	have	noted,	natural	selection	cannot	create	anything.		When	theorists	applaud	the	power	of	natural	selection,	what	they	are	really	doing	is	remarking	on	the	poverty	of	the	sources	of	change	with	which	selection	has	to	work,	these	being	restricted	to	small	random	changes	in	the	genome.		In	the	debate	over	the	adequacy	of	the	Modern	
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Sythesis,	questions	arise	whether	certain	kinds	of	change	happen	or	not,	notably	changes	with	some	inherent	tendency	to	be	adaptive	(Lamarckianism);	and	also	whether	kinds	of	changes	that	are	acknowledged	to	happen	are	available	to	evolution	by	natural	selection.		The	latter	question	tends	to	revolve	around	the	adequacy	of	the	modes	of	inheritance	that	are	supposed	to	embed	the	relevant	changes	in	a	lineage.		Numerous	sources	of	evolutionary	novelty	have	been	proposed	(here	I	do	not	mean	by	“novelty”	any	particular	exceptional	degree	of	novelty).		The	Modern	Synthesis	typically	restricts	these	to	genetic	changes,	notably	mutation	and	recombination,	but	in	principle	also	lateral	acquisition	of	genetic	material,	though	often	this	last	is	argued	to	be	of	relatively	small	importance.		(Even	very	occasional	lateral	acquisition	could	be	disproportionately	important,	however,	as	it	might	come,	as	is	familiar	in	bacteria,	with	pre-packaged	functionality.		The	vast	numbers	of	viruses	and	similar	entities	in	the	biosphere	provide	a	plausible	means	for	such	acquisition.)		In	the	microbial	world,	where	the	processes	I	have	been	discussing	that	account	for	the	emergence	of	species,	or	lineages,	as	individuals	do	not	occur,	it	is	plausible	that	pretty	much	the	standard	Modern	Synthesis	model	of	genetic	change	and	selection	is	sufficient	to	account	for	evolutionary	change.		As	microbial	evolution	is	all	there	was	for	80%	of	the	history	of	life,	this	is	no	minor	concession.	It	is	again	important,	however,	to	note	the	potential	significance	of	lateral	acquisition	of	genetic	material.		Microbes	evolved	in	a	context	in	which	a	far	wider	pool	of	genetic	resources	was	potentially	available	than	merely	those	in	their	own	lineage,	narrowly	conceived.		On	the	other	hand	the	price	paid	for	this,	one	might	say,	was	the	impossibility	of	establishing	higher-level	entities,	integrated	lineages.	The	emergence	of	sex	in	eukaryotes,	at	least	1.2	billion	years	ago	(Butterfield	2000),	made	possible	the	appearance	of	species	as	persisting	individuals.	Rescher	(2004)	remarks,	“For	process	philosophy,	what	a	thing	is	consists	in	what	it	does”,	so	if	sexually	integrated	species	are	indeed	individual	processes,	we	might	wonder	whether	there	is	anything	they	do,	beyond	just	persisting	through	time.		The	answer	to	this	question	might	even	offer	a	fresh	perspective	on	the	long	debated	question	of	why	sex	evolved	at	all.			The	immediate	answer	to	the	question	what	species	(or	strictly,	as	noted	earlier,	populations)	do	is,	of	course,	evolve.		But	the	capacity	to	evolve	preceded	the	appearance	of	sex,	so	what	we	should	consider	is	whether	the	species	as	individual	provides	enhanced	evolvability.		Moreover,	since	sexual	reproduction	provides	a	boundary	to	the	species,	and	a	barrier	to	the	acquisition	of	external	genetic	material,	it	appears	prima	facie	to	reduce	evolvability.		So	if	evolvability	is	indeed	an	advantage	that	partly	explains	the	persistence	and	increasing	dominance	of	sexual	species,	we	might	expect	the	gains	in	this	regard	to	be	substantial.		The	ability	of	advantageous	genetic	features	to	spread	more	rapidly	through	a	species,	and	the	ability,	through	recombination,	of	several	advantageous	alleles	to	be	selected	simultaneously,	are	sometimes	proposed	as	decisive	advantages	of	sex.		However,	this	does	little	to	explain	the	evolution	of	
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K-selected	sexual	species,	where	such	advantages	seem	only	a	minor	compensation	for	the	great	losses	in	this	respect	due	to	slow	reproductive	processes	and	small	numbers	of	offspring.		If	the	highly	integrated	species	is	indeed	a	vehicle	for	greater	evolvability,	it	is	surely	because	it	provides	new	sources	of	selectable	variability.		And	indeed	there	are	many	familiar	phenomena,	already	discussed	above	and	in	other	essays	in	this	volume,	that	offer	to	provide	just	this.				First,	integrated	species	appear	to	offer	a	much	more	favourable	environment	for	the	transition	from	intra-specific	competition	to	cooperation,	as	exemplified	in	the	very	high	levels	of	cooperation	found	in	eusocial	species	and	in	humans.		In	the	former	case,	especially	in	the	eusocial	insects,	it	is	widely	accepted	that	the	integrated	colonies	are	a	kind	of	organism	(or	“superoganism”)	and	clearly	they	have	capacities	far	beyond	those	of	their	constituent	individuals.	The	striking	success	of	these	insects	and	indeed	of	humans	testifies	to	the	evolutionary	success	of	this	kind	of	cooperation.		The	extended	care	found	in	K-selected	species	provides	an	opportunity	for	a	developmental	system	with	multiple	inputs	in	addition	to	the	material	of	reproduction	(Oyama	1985;	Oyama	et	al.	2001).		These	include	the	environmental	inputs	made	possible	by	the	niche	constructing	activities	of	previous	and	present	conspecifics	and	a	wide	variety	of	parental	effects.	They	also	provide	an	opportunity	for	the	transmission	of	sometimes	complex	cultural	traditions.		All	of	these	aspects	of	the	developmental	system	are	in	principle	entirely	heritable,	and	thus	provide	potential	pathways	of	evolutionary	change.	Niche	construction	and	maintenance	activities,	or	parenting	activities	can	be	learned	and	passed	down	the	generations,	and	culture	may	be	passed	down	through	this	and	other	routes	in	a	more	widely	social	species.		This	evolution	may	be	solely	behavioural,	but	it	may	also	be	physiological	through	the	epigenetic	direction	of	developmental	plasticity.			It	is	hard	to	deny,	though	there	is	a	very	powerful	ideological	tendency	to	do	so,	that	much	evolutionary	change	through	these	pathways	has	the	potential	to	be	both	acquired	and	adaptive.		At	the	most	uncontroversial	end	is	human	culture.		We	can	argue,	of	course,	whether	it	is	a	good	thing,	but	that	innovations	in	food	production,	say,	are	introduced	because	they	produce	more	food,	is	uncontroversial.		Much	behavioural	innovation	that	has	been	observed	in	other	primates—food	washing,	termite	fishing,	and	so	on—has	a	similar	character.		How	widespread	this	is	is	not	something	I	shall	discuss	here.		The	point	is	only	that	a	more	integrated	species	does	indeed	provide	multiple	new	evolutionary	pathways	that	have	in	demonstrable	instances	resulted	in	adaptive	evolutionary	change.				There	is	a	curious	tendency	to	dismiss	all	such	evolutionary	pathways	on	the	grounds	that	they	are	too	transient	and	allegedly	less	durable	than	genetic	change.		Perhaps	this	tendency	has	been	encouraged	by	Dawkins’s	already	remarked	appeal	to	immortality	(1976,	ch.	3)	in	his	argument	for	the	overwhelming	evolutionary	importance	of	DNA.		It	is	at	any	rate	extraordinary	
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that	one	should	require	the	explanation	of	a	changing	process	to	be	grounded	in	unchanging	causes,	and	perhaps	can	be	seen	as	a	paradigm	of	the	misleading	effects	of	a	substance-rather	than	properly	process-based	ontology.			One	further	key	point	is	the	following.		Species	are	a	diverse	category.		Arguably	they	are	ontologically	diverse,	encompassing	both	processes	and	kinds,	as	profound	a	diversity	as	imaginable.		More	prosaically,	even	as	concrete	entities,	they	differ	in	very	significant	respects.		If	species	are	what	evolve,	we	should	not,	for	this	reason,	expect	quite	general	accounts	of	evolution.		The	Modern	Symnthesis,	specifically,	may	be	more	or	less	true	for	some	kinds	of	species,	but	quite	inadequate	for	others.		If	species	have	evolved	new	forms	of	evolvability,	this	is	surely	to	be	expected.	Evolvability	of	many	populations	may	just	be	a	summative	property	of	organism	properties,	but	as	species	become	integrated	processes	it	is	plausible	that	evolvability	might	emerge	as	a	specific	capacity	of	lineages.		This	leads	me	to	a	more	speculative	final	thought.		There	is	a	philosophical		tradition	of	seeing	organisms	as	a	kind	of	agent,	as	beings	in	some	way	autonomously	pursuing	their	own	goals	or	interests.		Denis	Walsh	(2015)	argues	that	ths	is	a	vital	part	of	an	organism-centred	view	of	evolution	of	the	kind	championed	by	Darwin,	and	as	opposed	to	contemporary	molecule-centred	views.		Substance-	(or	thing-)	based	thinking	has	struggled	with	the	idea	of	organisms	as	agents,	and	has	often	considered	that	at	most	humans	achieved	this	rarefied	status.	For	a	process,	intrinsically	dynamic,	and	dynamic	in	ways	that	conduce	to	the	persistence	of	the	process,	agency	is	a	much	more	natural	attribution.		Hence	process	thinkers,	such	as	the	mid-twentieth	century	organicists	(Russell	1924,	Haldane	1931,	Bertalanffy	1952)	thought	agency	a	quite	general	feature	of	organisms.		If	some	species	are	themselves	living	processes,	might	they	themselves	have	a	kind	of	agency,	inherent	tendencies	to	change	(act)	in	ways	that	promote	their	survival?		If	we	take	seriously	the	claim	that	species	are	individuals	then	this	is	at	least	a	possibility	worth	investigation.		Acknowledgments		I	am	very	grateful	to	Stephan	Guttinger,	Anne	Sophie	Meincke,	and	Dan	Nicholson,	and	also	members	of	the	Egenis	Biological	Interest	Group,	for	extensive	discussion	and	comments	on	an	earlier	draft.		The	research	leading	to	this	article	has	received	funding	from	the	European	Research	Council	under	the	European	Union’s	Seventh	Framework	Programme	(FP7/2007-2013)/ERC	Grant	Agreement	324186.		Bibliography		Bechtel	W	2017	Explicating	Top-Down	Causation	Using	Networks	and	Dynamics.	Philosophy	of	Science	84:	253-274.		Bertalanffy	L	1952	Problems	of	life:	An	evaluation	of	modern	biological	and	
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